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ABSTRACT 
This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the “rational voter model” so as to include the 
potential effects of “direct democracy” on the voter participation rate.  Direct democracy is assumed to 
take two forms:  initiatives and referenda.  This study tests the hypothesis that initiatives and/or 
referenda may significantly affect voter turnout because although they may elevate the expected gross 
benefits of voting by “empowering voters.”  Using cross-section analysis for the 50 states for the 1998 
general election, this study finds that referenda did significantly increase voter turnout. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Voting is a fundamental component of the process of determining the size and form of government 
outlays, taxation, regulatory and other decisions, and hence plays a significant role in societal resource 
allocation. No theory of voter behavior has received greater attention than that introduced by Downs 
(1957). Since Downs (1957) first introduced the Rational Voter Model, numerous other studies have 
appeared to enhance or test the theory or variants thereof, including (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), 
(Buchanan, 1968), (Riker and Ordeshook, 1968), (Brazel and Silberberg, 1973), (Ashenfelter and Kelly, 
1975), (Kafoglis and Cebula, 1981), (Cebula and Kafoglis, 1983), (Ledyard, 1984), (Cox and Munger, 
1989), (Morton, 1991), (Teixeira, 1992), (Aldrich, 1993), (Green and Shapiro, 1994), (Verba, Schlozman, 
and Brady, 1995), (Leighly, 1996), (Knack, 1999), (Copeland and Laband, 2002), (Barreto, Segura and 
Woods, 2004), (Feddersen, 2004), and (Cebula, 2005).  Concern over low voter participation rates for 
the U.S. is expressed frequently in the media and elsewhere. In the words of Putnam (2000, p. 31), “with 
the singular exception of voting, American rates of political participation compare favorably with those 
in other democracies…”Putnam (2000, p. 31) further observes that “We are reminded each election year 
that fewer voters show up at the polls in America than in most other democracies…” 
Clearly, since election outcomes can have profound resource allocation implications, the underlying 
free-rider problem in the voting decision may carry a huge price tag.  So, what determines the benefits 
of voting?  And what determines voter participation or the lack of it?  Once there is a better 
understanding of the answers to these questions, perhaps there will also be a better answer to the 
question “How can the U.S. voter participation rate be increased?” 
In an effort to help answer these questions, the objective of this study is to determine whether “direct 
democracy” influences the voter participation rate.  In this study, direct democracy can take the form of 
either referenda or initiatives (or both).  The actual hypothesis being tested in this study is that 
referenda and/or initiatives do increase the voter participation rate (voter turnout).  This is because the 
existence of referenda and/or initiatives presumably enhances the power of voters to influence 
government decision-making.  This enhancement implies increased expected gross benefits from voting, 
which in turn increases the expected net benefits from voting, ceteris paribus. 
The model is a cost-benefit framework that parallels the rational voter model.  This is provided in 
Section 2 of this study.  Section 3 provides the empirical analysis, which consists of a cross-section 
analysis of the 50 states in the 1998 general election.  Section 4 of the study provides a summary and 
overview. 
2. THE FRAMEWORK 
Paralleling in principle the rational voter model, it is hypothesized that the probability that a given 
eligible voter will actually vote, PROBV, is an increasing function of the expected gross benefits (EGB) 
associated with voting, ceteris paribus, and a decreasing function of the expected gross costs (EGC) 
associated with voting, ceteris paribus.  Thus, if follows that: 
PROBV = f (EGB, EGC), fEGB > 0, fEGC < 0; f (EGB-EGC) > 0 
The central hypothesis being tested in this study addresses whether referenda (REFERE) and initiatives 
(INIT) increase the power of voters, thereby increasing EGB and (EGB-EGC) and hence the voter 
participation rate (VPR).  It is argued in this study that referenda may indeed increase the power of voter 
by enabling them to make decisions that elected representatives might otherwise make.  Much the 
same can be said of initiatives, namely, that initiatives may empower voters by enabling them to some 
degree to establish agendas for elected representative officials to follow, which in turn elevates the ECB 
and hence (EGB-EGC). 
Aside from REFERE and INIT, other factors influence the voters’ EGBs and EGCs; For instance, it is argued 
here that the greater the level of educational achievement, the greater may be the expected gross 
benefits from voting, ceteris paribus. Arguably, the higher one’s educational attainment, the greater 
one’s knowledge of and appreciation of the significance of voter participation per se in a democratic 
society.  Indeed, greater levels of average educational attainment may lead to the subjective assessment 
that voting per se yields greater benefits, regardless of the election outcome, insofar as voting can be 
used: (a) to create positive feelings about fulfilling one’s “civic duty”; (b) to create the feeling of helping 
to maintain the vitality and survival of the democratic process (in part, by obfuscating the free-rider); 
and (c) to create the feeling of helping to clarify the degree to which election winners (and the political 
parties with which they are affiliated) can interpret their victories as only marginal or as a mandate for 
implementing their espoused policies/party platforms.  Thus, it is hypothesized that the greater the 
percentage of the population in a state with at least a high school diploma (HS), the higher the voter 
participation rate (VPR) in the state, ceteris paribus. 
The female labor force participation rate (FLFPR) may also influence the expected benefits from voting.  
Over time, the FLFPR has risen dramatically.  Observe, for instance, that the FLFPR rose at the national 
level from under 40 percent in 1965 to roughly 60 percent in 1998 (Council of Economic Advisors, 2005, 
Table B-39).  As the FLFPR rises, the percentage of the female population in the workplace increases and 
arguably thereby becomes more/better informed on and sensitive to a variety of labor market and 
economic issues.  Moreover, this increased awareness of and sensitivity to such issues would seem likely 
to breed an increased interest in the potential impact that their votes might carry.  That is, as the FLFPR 
increase, women in the workplace may perceive a greater need (benefit) from acting on behalf of their 
own best interests with respect to participating in the election process.  Hence, it is hypothesized that 
the higher the FLFPRE in a state, the greater the overall VPR in that state, ceteris paribus. 
It is also expected that the more poorly a state’s economy is performing, e.g., the higher the state’s 
unemployment rate (UR), the greater the interest the public (eligible voters) in the state may have in the 
outcome of a major election.  As Cebula (2005, p. 162) argues, if “…the unemployment rate…is rising, 
the public may wish to express their various fears and concerns about…unemployment and/or their 
feelings for a need for economic policy changes.”  Therefore, the greater the UR in a state, the greater 
may be the expected benefits from voting as the public uses voting to express their feelings (Copeland 
and Laband, 2002), i.e., their fears and concerns regarding actual and potential job loss and/or desires 
for more efficacious government economic policies.  Hence, it is hypothesized here that he greater the 
UR in a state, the greater the VPR in that state, ceteris [airbus. 
Next, there is the issue of the expected cost of voting per se.  Factors systematically affecting the EGC 
theoretically could assume a variety of forms, one of which might well be reflected by median family 
income (MFI).  Arguable, the higher the MFI, the greater the opportunity cost of voting, i.e., the 
incentive to free-ride is increased.  Alternatively, people with this higher income may be so immersed in 
their work/careers that they either do not have the time to be well enough informed voters to 
intelligently/effectively vote (and therefore feel that the act of voting is not efficient or meaningful) 
and/or simply do not have the actual time per se to vote.  Thus, it is hypothesized that the higher the 
MFI in a state, the lower the VPR in that state, ceteris paribus. 
Finally, age might influence the expected benefits from voting.  The population age 65 and older (AGE) is 
largely retired.  In addition, much of this age group lives more or less on a fixed income or depends to 
some degree on Medicare and Social Security.  Thus, this age group might be quite sensitive to such 
considerations as Social Security benefits, Medicare and Medicaid policies, income tax rates, and the 
taxability of Social Security benefits, as well as economic conditions such as inflation.  These types of 
policy and economic conditions can significantly influence the economic status and physical health of 
those in this age group.  Moreover, this age group may have more than other age groups to study issues 
and candidates, as well as to organize among themselves in support or opposition to certain policies or 
candidates. As a result, is expected that the greater the proportion of a state’s population that is age 65 
or older, the greater the VPR in that state, ceteris paribus. 
Based upon the arguments about, equation (1) can be restated as: 
EGB = g (REFERE, INIT, HS, FLFPRE, UR, AGE), gREFERE > 0, gHS > 0, ggFLFPRE > 0,  
gUR > 0, gAGE > 0                          (2) 
EGC = h (MFI), hMFI > 0          (3) 
Based upon (2) and (3), it follows that the voter participation rate (VPR) function is given by: 
VPR = j (REFERE, INIT, HS, FLFPR, UR, MFI, AGE), jREFERE > 0, jINIT > 0, jHS > 0, jFLFPR > 0, 
 jUR > 0, jMFI < 0, jAGE > 0                     (4) 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Based on the model outlined in (4), the following reduced-form equation is to be estimated: 
VPRk = a0 + a1 REFERE, + a2 INIT k + a3 HSk + a4 URk + a5 FLFPRk + a6 MFIk + a7 AGEk + u                      (5) 
where: 
VPRk = the voter participation rate in state k in the 1998 general election, expressed as a percent; 
A0 = constant term; 
REFEREk = a binary (dummy) variable indicating those states offering voters the power to vote on 
referenda: for those states with referenda, REFEREk = 1; REFEREk = 0 otherwise; 
INITk = a binary (dummy) variable indicating those states offering voters the power to vote on initiatives: 
for those states with initiatives, INITk = 1; INITk = 0 otherwise: 
HSk = the percentage of the adult population in state k age 25 years and older that had at least a high 
school diploma in the year 1998; 
FLFPRk = the female labor force participation rate in state k in the year 1998, expressed as a percent; 
URk = the percentage unemployment rate of the civilian labor force in the state k in the year 1998; 
MFIk = the median family income in state k in the year 1998; 
AGEk = the percent of state k’s population in year 1998 that was age 65 or older; 
u = stochastic error term. 
The estimate deals with the 1998 general election.  The choice of 1998 involved several considerations.  
First, it was deemed preferable to examine a major election year that was not a Presidential election 
year, since Presidential election years tend to bring voters to the polls for a variety of “emotional” 
reasons (Copeland and Laband, 2002) that might obscure the effects of either referenda or initiatives on 
voter turnout.  Second, although 2002 was an even-numbered election year and thus something of a 
“major” election year, it nevertheless was the year following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001, which fact might have acted to make election motives in 2002 more complex to interpret.  Thus, 
the year 1998 was the most recent even-numbered election year that was not associated with either a 
Presidential election or a possible post-9/11 trauma.  Indeed, because of the facts that 1998 was neither 
a Presidential election year nor a year associated with the trauma of the September 11th terrorist 
attacks, this year might be appealing to study because it may enable us to focus on those who are more 
“serious” voters. 
To measure “direct democracy,” two dummy variable are adopted, REFERE, and INITk.  A total of 24 
states provide the referendum process, whereas 24 states offer the initiative process. The two sets of 
states are nearly identical.  The only differences between the two sets would be that:  Illinois, Florida 
and Mississippi do offer the initiative process but not the referendum process, whereas New Mexico, 
Kentucky, and Maryland do offer the referendum process but not the initiative process. The source for 
the VPR date is http://www.uselectionatlas.org/USPRESIDENT/vto.php?year=2004&datatype=national. 
The other variables were obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau (2001, Tables 404, 219, 606, 572, 667, 
20). 
Estimating equation (6) by OLS, adopting the White (1980) heteroskedasticity correction, yields: 
VPRk = -133.6 + 7.004 REFEREk – 4.303 INITk + 0.0.89 HSk + 2.35 URk 
  (+2.50)  (-1.50)  (+2.57)        (+2.41) 
+ 1.41 FLFPRk – 0.0003 MFIk, + 0.55 AGEk, R2 = 0.64, adjR
2 = 0.58, F = 10.69   (6) 
(+4.21)  (-1.43)  (+1.04) 
where terms in parenthesis are t-values. 
In equation (6), the estimated coefficients on three of the five non-dummy variables exhibit the 
expected signs and are statistically significant at beyond the five percent level.  The estimated 
coefficient on one of the measure of direct democracy, REFERE, is significant at the two percent level 
with hypothesized positive sign; however the coefficient on INIT fails to be statistically significant at the 
ten percent level.  The coefficient of determination is 0.64, so that the model explains more than three-
fifths of the variation in the voter participation rate.  Finally, the F-statistic is significant at beyond the 
one percent level, attesting to the overall strength of the model. 
According to equation (6), the estimated coefficient on variable HS is positive and significant at the two 
percent level, implying (as hypothesized) that the voter participation rate in a state is an increasing 
function of the percent of the state’s population with at least a high school diploma.  Next, the 
coefficient on the FLFPR variable is positive and significant at the one percent level. This result implies 
that the VPR in a state is an increasing function of the state’s female labor force participation rate (as 
hypothesized).  The coefficient on the UR variable is positive and significant at the two percent level, 
implying (as hypothesized) that voter turnout is a state is an increasing function of it unemployment 
rate.  The coefficients on variables MFI and AGE are negative and positive, respectively, but both fail to 
be significant at the ten percent level. 
Finally, there are the results for the “direct democracy” variable.  The sign on the estimated coefficient 
for the REFERE variable is positive, as hypothesized, and significant at beyond the two percent level.  
Thus, this measure of direct democracy appears to induce an increase in the voter participation rate; 
indeed, the results imply that referenda increase voter participation by roughly 7.0 percentage points! 
The coefficient on the INIT variable, which is actually negative, fails to be significant at the ten percent 
level.  Thus, it appears that the net impact on voter turnout of direct democracy, as represented by the 
referendum process and the initiative process combined, is on balance positive. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
This study argues that direct democracy, as reflected by referenda and initiatives, may raise the voter 
participation rate.  This argument is based on the notion that such forms of direct democracy act to 
“empower” voters and thereby raise the expected gross benefits of voting (EGB).  In so doing, they also 
would raise the expected net benefits of voting (EGB-EGC). 
This study uses cross-section voting date from 1998 general election, a study year that has the virtue of 
being recent on the one hand and yet on the other hand is neither a Presidential election year nor a year 
closely following the terrorist attacks of September 11th of 2001.  The system includes a number of 
economic and demographic factors (median family income levels, educational attainment, 
unemployment rates, the female labor force participation rate, and age).  The basic conclusion of the 
analysis is that direct democracy in the form of referenda may exercise a significant positive impact on 
the voter participation rate.  Further research into this topic would seem advisable in order to track the 
impact of referenda on voter turnout over time, especially since the voter turnout trend has largely 
been downwards over the last four decades. 
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